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INTRODUCTION: FAIRNESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING
Debates over environmental issues usually involve questions of distribution.
Problems such as deciding where to site noxious facilities, how to share the
costs of cleaning up pollution, and how to allocate natural resources equitably
all raise concerns over who will bear the costs of using (or not using) natural
resources. While science and economics can outline efficient and effective
solutions to technical problems, the ultimate choice between possible solutions
can only be made after considering qualitative issues such as power, politics,
public opinion, tradition, and fairness.
Fairness is particularly important in fashioning agreements on environmen-
tal policy. Negotiators frequently appeal to fairness in advocating policies, and
solutions seen as unfair are unlikely to be accepted or, if implemented, to
survive for long. Numerous examples of the rejection of sound, but unfair,
proposals exist.' Despite its importance, the study of fairness, particularly as
a feature of environmental agreements, is relatively new.2 Perhaps this is
because the importance of fairness to a successful agreement seems intuitive.
According to one commentator, fairness "encourage[s] the agreement or
cooperation of those who pay the costs."3  Others concur that fairness
contributes both to the ability to come to an agreement and to the durability
of such an agreement once made.' Recent examinations of fairness in
*I would like to thank the American Academy of Sciences for the opportunity to conduct
research on this subject at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
1. See, e.g., CHITRU S. FERNANDO ET AL., FINANCING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WITH EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY (The Wharton School of
the University of Pennsylvania 1993) (discussing effect of fairness on willingness-to-pay and
successful agreement); Anna Vari, Public Perceptions about Equity and Fairness: Siting Low
Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities in the United States and Hungary 15 (June 20-22,
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (proposing consideration of six fairness
criteria based on analysis of resistance to disposal site selection in New York and Hungary).
2. For two examples of recent studies of fairness in the environmental context, see Cecilia
Albin, Negotiating the Acid Rain Problem in Europe: A Fairness Perspective (June 20-22, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); H. Peyton Young & Amanda Wolf, Global
Warming Negotiations: Does Fairness Matter?, THE BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1992, at 46.
3. H. PEYTON YOUNG ET AL., COST ALLOCATION IN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT-
A CASE STUDY OF SWEDEN 1, 7 (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
[hereinafter HASA] Working Paper No. 80-32, 1980).
4. CECILIA ALBIN, FAIRNESS ISSUES IN NEGOTIATION: STRUCTURE, PROCESS, PROCEDURE
AND OUTCOME 3-5 (IIASA Working Paper No. 92-88, 1992).
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environmental agreements have focused on hazardous waste facility siting'
sulfur dioxide reduction in Europe,6 and global climate change.
Despite the burgeoning research on fairness in environmental agreements,'
no research to date has focused specifically on water quality agreements.'
Water quality management invokes a set of concerns and problems unique to
the discipline. Its goal is to control pollution to tolerable levels, a task made
difficult by the potential number of pollutants involved and uncertainty as to
the effects of multiple pollutants once they are discharged into the environment.
Water quality problems are diverse: they may be local or international in scope,
chronic or acute (as with spills), caused by point or nonpoint sources, and due
to organic or inorganic pollutants. Water quality standards vary by use; those
water quality levels considered acceptable for one use may be unacceptable for
another. The situation is confounded by the differing priorities that individuals,
regions, and nations attach to water uses, making comparisons between water
quality agreements exceedingly complex. Strategies for addressing water quality
issues have also been changing over time. An increasing emphasis on basin-
wide management" and use of economic incentives adds additional variables
to the fairness equation.
This Note examines fairness in the context of water quality agreements,
particularly international transboundary river agreements. It surveys cases of
environmental policy making, focusing on the criteria which actors in previous
water quality agreements have used to define fairness. The method adopted
follows a descriptive approach.1 Part I briefly outlines recent philosophical,
economic, and interdisciplinary approaches to analyzing the concept of fairness.
5. See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Bruno S. Frey, Fairness in Siting Decisions-Theory and
Empirical Results (June 20-22, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Vari,
supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., ALBIN, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., FERNANDO Er AL., supra note 1; Young & Wolf, supra note 2.
8. See Alan McDonald, Fairness in River Basin Agreements (June 20-22,1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (presenting a database of water resource agreements).
9. The definition of "water quality agreement" used in this note is quite broad. "Water
quality agreement" is used here to mean any decision related to water quality management in
which fairness could be significant, including negotiations, court cases, and most administrative
law. Although domestic administrative law may not explicitly invoke fairness concepts, regulators
(at least in a democracy) must pay attention to what will be perceived as fair by the parties
affected. At a minimum, they must avoid a solution which is so patently unfair that the affected
parties refuse to accept or enforce it.
10. See; e.g., Ludwik A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Toxic Pollution and the
Drainage Basin Concept, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 589, 591 (1985).
11. For examples of the descriptive approach, see generally Albin, supra note 2; Vari, supra
note 1; Amanda Wolf, Environmental Risks and Agreement Fairness: International Conventions
on Whale Hunting and CFC Emissions (June 20-22, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author); infra Part III.
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Part II sketches the ways in which fairness concerns manifest themselves by
examining the legal and institutional settings of water quality management.
Part III applies a fairness framework to existing and proposed international
water quality agreements. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting directions
for future work in fairness in water quality agreements.
I. APPROACHES TO ANALYZING FAIRNESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEM SOLVING
A. Philosophical and Economic Approaches to Fairness
Fairness plays a key role in forming and enforcing environmental quality
agreements by determining how the various costs and benefits associated with
them will be distributed.' Parties involved will be unlikely to commit to
proposed agreements that do not address their needs. Likewise, fairness
promotes the durability of agreements by ensuring that the parties involved
have incentives to enforce them.
Given that fairness is an essential component of environmental agreements,
it would be extraordinarily valuable to develop a model that could predict what
elements of an agreement would be considered fair by the parties involved.
Unfortunately, a brief philosophical inquiry reveals that such a model is
impossible to construct. Philosophers seek to explain or deduce ideas about
fairness from fundamental values, principles, or conceptions of rights. But
within any society, multiple beliefs and values exist. Young points out that
Aristotle's classical normative theories of justice (allocation according to
contribution), Bentham's classical utilitarianism (the greatest good for the
greatest number), and Rawls' maximin principle (the least well-off party should
be made as well-off as possible with respect to a given criterion) each fail to
explain or predict what is perceived as fair in most practical situations. 3 To
account for and encompass multiple theories of justice, several philosophers
have begun to develop pluralistic approaches to fairness in environmental
issues. 4 However, once fairness is construed as a pluralistic concept, fairness
in a universal sense becomes nonsensical. Rather than being a predetermined
goal, fairness is a function of the political process in developing specific
agreements.
The question of fairness can also be examined in economic terms. The
pragmatic goal of economic analysis of environmental problems is to formulate
efficient solutions that maximize society's net benefits." Neoclassical
12. McDonald, supra note 8, at 1. See also Albin, supra note 2, at 2-6.
13. H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9-10 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Douglas L. MacLean, Variations on Fairness (June 20-22, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
15. See generally TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1992).
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economics defines efficient allocations of resources as those which are "Pareto
optimal," meaning that there is no way to redistribute resources to make a
party better off without making at least one other party worse off.16 Applying
Pareto optimality is problematic in that many real-world situations seem to
contradict it.'7 For example, under a pure efficiency analysis, no allocation of
cleanup costs in which upstream parties pay for benefits enjoyed entirely by
downstream parties makes sense. Yet many such non-Pareto optimal
agreements exist. To compensate for the inherent limits of Pareto optimality,
economists generally advocate applying distributional equity criteria in addition
to efficiency criteria to analyze public policy problems. Equity and efficiency
are separate goals, and, as such, they may complement each other, diametrically
oppose each other, or fall somewhere in between."8
Economists typically address the problem of equitable distribution in one
of three ways. First, they may acknowledge the importance of equity but
dismiss it as lacking a coherent framework for analyzing distributive issues. 9
Second, they may adopt a single principle of equity as reasonable and employ
it as a basis for their analyses. For example, Romani proposes an "equitable"
allocation of pollution reduction costs in which a "just" principle is defined as
"that which the parties concerned would choose themselves if they had no
vested interests."" Romani applies this notion of equity to argue that the
"polluter pays principle" is a fair one, acknowledging that the principle may not
be ethically satisfactory, but at least it is not unjust.2 Third, economists may
analyze several alternative principles and distributional rules by applying the
consistency principle, in which goods are allocated "so that every two claimants
divide the amount allotted to them as they would if they were the only two
claimants." 2 An allocation that satisfies the consistency principle can always
be achieved.' In each of these approaches, economists rest their treatment
of equity upon ethical assumptions which may or may not hold for a given real
case.
An alternative to purely economic analysis is the descriptive approach,
which analyzes how past negotiators have sought to achieve efficiency in their
agreements while simultaneously promoting equitable distribution. The
descriptive approach combines aspects of both economics and philosophy. It
16. Id. at 28.
17. See generally Talbot Page, Intergenerational Justice as Opportunity, in ENERGY AND THE
FUTURE 38 (Douglas MacLean & Peter Brown eds., 1983) (discussing discounting and
intergenerational inequity).
18. ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE OFF 4 (The Brookings
Institution ed., 1975).
19. See YOUNG, supra note 13, at 5-6.
20. FRANCO ROMAN!, Equity and Transfrontier Pollution, in ECONOMICS OFTRANSFRONTIER
POLLUTION 21 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ed., 1976).
21. Id.
22. YOUNG, supra note 13, at 15 (emphasis omitted).
23. Id.
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does not attempt to prescribe what is fair in a normative sense, but instead
uncovers criteria that have contributed to the perception of fairness in past
agreements. The descriptive approach complements economic research by
casting light on the assumptions that have been made by past negotiators,
providing a rich narrative of the range of distributions that have previously
been considered fair.
B. A Descriptive Approach to Fairness
The descriptive approach to fairness analysis is both empirical and
interdisciplinary. Assuming that existing agreements embody implied rules of
fairness, the descriptive approach allows us to learn from experience. By
categorizing and cataloguing rules applied in past agreements, we can develop
a valuable "tool box" of fairness concepts that can be applied to future
agreements. The tool box can serve as a source of precedent and a resource
for negotiators in environmental debates who seek a variety of alternatives to
problem solving. For example, countries that collaborate on transboundary
hydroelectric projects traditionally divide the construction costs and the
resulting electric power equally. 4 While such a division makes sense in some
cases, it is not the only solution for how to share costs and benefits. Borrowing
fairness concepts from other situations could expand the universe of considered
solutions to include, for example, proportional distributions based on historical
rights, needs, or Gross National Product (GNP).
Additionally, having a tool box of environmental fairness principles can
improve communication within negotiations by allowing actors to better
understand their opponents' arguments. Expressing values in a common
language helps coordinate expectations about the goals of the proposed
agreement. Once the parties understand each other, they are better equipped
to communicate in a way that allows them to reach agreement.
C. Fairness Principles
Analysis of the fairness principles inherent in a water quality agreement
requires scrutiny of the allocation rules contained therein. An allocation rule
can be defined as "a method, process, or formula that allocates any given
supply of goods [and costs] among any potential group of claimants according
to the salient characteristics of those claimants."25 In the case of international
environmental water quality agreements, allocation rules are generally
determined by a group of negotiators acting on behalf of the countries involved.
Scholars take a variety of approaches to defining these rules when
describing problems with respect to fairness in environmental agreements.
24. McDonald, supra note 8, at 2-3.
25. YOUNG, supra note 13, at 8 (emphasis in original).
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Some researchers focus more on the negotiation process; others focus on its
outcome.26 Different taxonomies are used, but all express recurrent principles
of fairness that can be depicted as rules.2 7 Many of these classifications of
fairness principles use different words for the same concepts or provide
groupings which overlap. Young has developed a particularly helpful lexicon
in which he suggests that many agreements on fair allocations rest on the basic
principles of equality, proportionality, and priority28
"Equality" refers to situations in which costs or benefits are allocated
equally among the parties involved.2 9 The problem with the equality concept
is that the parties are rarely, if ever, similarly situated." While the allocation
process itself may be equal, inequality among the parties often results in an
unequal, and by implication, unfair end result. Depending both on the starting
point and the type of good or burden being allocated, applying equality can
result in widely disparate outcomes. For example, a policy requiring all
industries to share the burden of pollution control equally by installing the same
pollution control technology usually results in a much higher relative cost for
small companies than for large companies. Similarly, a policy requiring all
industries to achieve the same level of effluent control is often much more
expensive for older, more heavily polluting facilities than for newer, state-of-
the-art facilities.
The "proportionality principle" asserts that parties should be allocated the
costs or benefits of a particular program in proportion to the parties' differenc-
es.3" The way these differences are framed will have a critical impact on what
is considered fair.32 One frequently cited example of proportionality is the
Thirty Percent Club, a group of European countries (plus Canada) that each
agreed to reduce its 1980 sulfur dioxide emissions by at least thirty percent by
1993."3 Another example is the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine
Against Pollution by Chlorides, a group of countries that agreed to control and
26. In the descriptive study of fairness, a distinction is made between process and outcome
fairness. Broadly construed, the 'process' is everything that occurs before the final agreement is
reached. Although a fair process does not guarantee a fair outcome (nor vice versa), the two are
no doubt related in people's minds. See Albin, supra note 4, at 11-26. The focus of this Note is
on outcomes of water quality management decisions.
27. FERNANDO, supra note 1, at 39-42; YOUNG, supra note 13, at 68-85.
28. YOUNG, supra note 13. For a summary of how these principles interrelate, see id. at 79-
80.
29. Id. at 75.
30. Id. at 79.
31. Id. at 68. Young attributes the prominence of the proportionality principle in Western
society to Aristotle's writings on distributive justice. Id.
32. See generally FERNANDO FT AL., supra note 1, at 35.
33. McDonald, supra note 8, at 6; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, EXECUTIVE BODY FOR THE CONVENTION ON LONG-
RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUIrON; .ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES FOR ALLOCATING THE
COSTS OF REDUCING SULFUR EMISSIONS IN EUROPE, U.N. Doc. EB.AIR/GE.2/R.26 (1989)
[hereinafter United Nations Economic Principles].
[4:85
FAIRNESS IN WATER QUALITY
reduce the amount of chloride ions being discharged into the Rhine River. 4
The "priority principle" assigns one party or group of parties absolute
precedence in the allocation of a good or burden. Adherence to the priority
principle is helpful for deciding how to allocate an indivisible good." The
priority principle asserts, "He who has the greatest claim gets the good; the
others do not."36 Like proportionality, priority does not allocate the actual
goods or burdens equally. Instead, it allocates to one party over another in
order to maximize a given societal. objective. It simply indicates an order of
precedence. 7 The prior appropriation doctrine, in which water is allocated
according to a "first in time, first in right" rule," is one example of the priority
principle applied to a water issue. Under prior appropriation, the first
claimant's water need is treated as an indivisible good and the original claim is
awarded priority.
D. Characteristics of the Parties
To apply the fairness principles to water quality agreements, three classes
of party characteristics should be considered: contribution (such as the amount
of pollution contributed by the party), need (how badly the party needs the
status quo to be altered), and endowment (e.g., the ability of the party to pay
for cleanup and residual injuries). 9  These characteristics are particularly
important for applying the proportionality principle, for they define the
differences that dictate what proportions will be used.
Consider the case in which a number of upstream parties pollute a river
used by a number of downstream parties. One way to characterize the
34. McDonald, supra note 8, at 5; see also text accompanying notes 122 -135.
35. Id. at 40.
36. YOUNG, supra note 13, at 14. The priority concept is also reflected in the two very
different theoretical frameworks of Bentham and Rawls. According to classical utilitarians like
Bentham, the utility maximizing allocation-should be chosen. Thus, the decision makers should
allocate the good to the party whose marginal utility is highest. In a way, then, the criteria of
economic efficiency may be considered to be a fair rule-if the parties have agreed to it. Each
of these approaches prioritizes some member(s) of society with respect to a societal goal. Id. at
81-82.
37. Id. at 15. Young offers the example of a wait list to get one's child admitted to a day care
center.
[The] list expresses a concept of who is most deserving, who is next-most deserving, and
so forth, given the claimants' circumstances and the good being distributed. Each
captures a notion of equity, but it is not equity in the Aristotelian sense of proportional-
ity. It is equity based on priority. Priority is an ordinal rather than a cardinal principle
because it does not say how much more deserving one claimant is compared to another.
It only says which among any pair of claimants is most deserving.
Id. (emphasis in original).
38. OTTO J. HELWEG, WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 140-41 (1985).
39. See FERNANDO, supra note 1, at 41-42; YOUNG, supra note 13, at 32-35.
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differences between the parties is in terms of contribution. If the costs of
cleanup are allocated proportionately to contribution, parties who contribute
the most pollution to the river will pay the most in cleanup costs. This
illustrates the "polluter pays" doctrine,40 a proportionality-based concept. An
alternative way to characterize the differences is by relative need for the desired
use. In this same scenario, downstream parties suffering the most from
pollution will gain the most from cleanup. Since downstream parties benefit the
most, they should bear the largest costs of cleanup. This is an example of the
need-based "victim pays" doctrine.4 Third, differences can be characterized
in terms of endowment. Using an endowment rationale, wealthier parties, who
can more easily afford to pay for cleanup, should pay the greater share.
E. A Fairness Framework
The principles and characteristics outlined above are only meaningful when
applied to specific issues of distribution. The unique characteristics and
complexities inherent in water quality management should be considered when
analyzing water quality agreements with respect to fairness. Water quality
protection strategies, typical management institutions, and the level of certainty
all affect the framework for fairness.
1. Characteristics of Water Quality Management
Rivers, lakes, and other surface waters provide wildlife habitat, drinking
water, recreational uses, a means of waste disposal, a source of cooling water
for industry, and hydroelectric power. These uses can be compatible. In many
cases, however, the multiple uses and the many different users42 may come
into conflict. When the uses desired by different parties are not compatible or
are predicted to conflict in the future, questions of fair allocation arise.
From an economic perspective, the goal of water quality management is to
achieve an optimal level of water quality at the minimum cost feasible.
Economists define the optimal effluent load as the level of pollution for which
the sum of the cleanup costs and the damage from residual pollution are
minimized.4' The usual approach to achieving desired water quality is to focus
on one of two standards:' Ambient standards for water quality limit the
maximum allowable instream concentration for a given pollutant, such as
40. See generally United Nations Economic Principles, supra note 33 (analyzing the polluter
pays and victim pays principles in the context of reducing sulfur emissions).
41. Id.
42. Potential users of a water body include not only riparian users at the shoreline, but users
* throughout the entire watershed. For definitions of riparian and watershed, see MICHAEL
JEFFRIES & DEREK MILLS, FRESHWATER ECOLOGY 17-18 (1990) (providing an overview of
watershed ecology).
43. See generally TIETENBERG, supra note 15, at 360-87 (providing an overview of the
economics of pollution control).
44. See also text accompanying notes 74-77.
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bacteria or heavy metals; emission sm ndards limit the level of pollutants that a
source is allowed to emit int,- 1 _,, r body. A common approach to water
quality management is to dt. n _ ambient standards, then set emission
standards to achieve the ambient limit.' Traditionally, water quality manage-
ment has focused on keeping the organic pollutant level below the assimilative
capacity of the water body. This concept is problematic, especially for stock
pollutants which are not absorbed but, rather, accumulate in the environ-
ment.
46
Management " water quality in rivers is particularly difficult because
riverine waters moN e in one direction, designating the parties involved as either
upstream or downstream actors. Because rivers are uni-directional, the
upstream actor has a natural advantage, which allows it to negotiate from a
position of power. The upstream/downstream relationship may not be a critical
factor in domestic situations where a central government has ultimate authority,
but it is crucial in international negotiations.
Water quality management issues are also made complex by substantial
scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of pollutants. This makes it
challenging to determine what effluent standards should be allowed-even when
the desired ambient quality standards have already been agreed upon. It may
well be that fairness principles are sometimes invoked to define a solution when
there is uncertainty about the technically optimal or economically efficient
solution. This may explain the existence of the Thirty Percent Club for sulfur
dioxide reduction in Europe.47 An efficient allocation of reductions could not
have been determined with existing information, even if efficiency were the
primary goal of the parties. It may be interesting to trace how fairness
principles and uncertainty interact in various cases. As scientific uncertainty
decreases, the importance of fairness in the debate may also decrease-or vice
versa.
2. Describing Equality in Distributions
Having established a lexicon for describing principles of fairness, it is also
necessary to choose language that describes how equality is distributed. Again,
Young's language is particularly useful. Young defines three terms for
describing equality in distributions: (1) "the objects that are treated equally;"
(2) "the baseline from which equality is measured;" and (3) "the yardstick of
measurement."48
45. See A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 97, 106-08 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) (analyzing control policy for water
pollution under the U.S. Clean Water Act).
46. TIETENBERG, supra note 15, at 361.
47. See supra text accompanying note 33.
48. YOUNG, supra note 13, at 75.
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"Objects" refers to the units that are being treated fairly. In water quality
issues, the objects might be nations, regions° industries, or individual users.
When a fairness principle such as equality i applied to one set of objects, it
may have very different effects on another set. For example, if two nations
seek to divide the cost of a cleanup project, a fairness argument using the
nation as object might be used to justify fifty-fifty cost-sharing. Consider,
however, the effects of the agreement on other possible objects, such as
taxpayers or individual industries. If the funds in the above example are to be
raised by a general tax and one of the countries has twice the population of the
other, the effect at the individual level will not be equal. The concept of
equality applied to individuals would result in the more populous country
bearing a greater total cost. At present, most international water quality
agreements are based, like the first example in this paragraph, on the riparian
state as the object. With the increasing recognition of the river basin as a unit
for management,49 industries and populations within the entire watershed may
emerge as more appropriate objects. Such a shift in perspective might
change-or be driven by-what is perceived as a fair pollution control
agreement.
The "baseline" is the point from which the fairness of the distribution is
measured. In most water quality management scenarios, two alternative
baselines exist. One baseline would be the. existing water quality, and the other
would be the "pristine" state of the water (although this is usually difficult to
quantitatively define and may be the source of substantial uncertainty).
Depending on which baseline is used, parties will make different claims as to
what they consider fair."0 For example, under a "status quo" baseline parties
will debate over whether or not it is fair to "grandfather" existing pollution
practices. If a "pristine" baseline is used, however, the difficult issue of
grandfathered claims would not be as likely to arise.
The "yardstick" is the measurement of what is being distributed. If the
cost of cleanup is distributed, the yardstick would be monetary units. If the
availability of clean water is distributed, the yardstick would be a measure of
quantity. The yardstick measures both gains and losses. It can also be thought
of as the good or burden being distributed among the objects. In deciding how
best to clean up a polluted river, for example, negotiators might discuss
distributing the predetermined allowable pollution load. In this case, the
yardstick might be biological oxygen demand. The same problem can be
looked at as a matter of distributing either the costs of attaining a given water
49. Teclaff & Teclaff, supra note 10, at 591-594.
50. This distinction has been one of the obstacles to an agreement on thermal pollution of the
Rhine. A difficulty in these negotiations was "to what extent the convention should respect
existing cooling practices or capacities instead of laying down maximum increases in temperature
or maximum temperatures based on ecological requirements." J. G. Lammers, The Rhine: Legal
Aspects of the Management of a Transboundary River, in NATURE MANAGEMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 440, 447 (W.D. Verwey ed., 1989).
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quality goal or the benefits from a pollution reduction plan. In the latter two
examples, the yardstick would b- onetary units.
Specifying the yardstick cat especially tricky if the priority principle is
used. As opposed to siting decisions, in which the facility is indivisible, most
water quality problems involve allocating a divisible good or burden: allowable
pollution, water quality, or cost. Water quality problems may, however, also
involve discrete goods and burdens. Such complexities make it very important
to be clear about the nature of what is being distributed.
For a given environmental dispute, the pollutants of interest, level of
certainty, institution.,, and power balances are usually taken as given. However,
the baseline, objects, and yardstick considered are questions of social construc-
tion and framing. This framing is likely to differ from case to case. Within a
given case, refraining the issue may lead to a different perspective of what is
fair. Therefore, it is important to be aware of how the problem is being framed
by participants and of the alternative ways of framing that exist. Proposing
alternate frameworks is part of the "tool box" of alternative fairness concepts
that may enhance water quality negotiations.
II. FAIRNESS IN WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT: LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS
This Note focuses on international water quality agreements, which are
defined as agreements formed between two or more different countries.
However, analysis of international water law and its inherent fairness issues is,
for a few reasons, best begun by looking at various domestic water systems.
First, domestic law informs international law. As there are few sanctioned
international law-making bodies, most international law is an application and
extension of the domestic law of the parties involved.5' Second, domestic
legal systems, including legislation, regulations, and judicial decisions, can be
construed as a manifestation of what the legal elite of that country consider to
be fair. The fairness principles that surface in domestic water quality law can
thus be extended to apply to what a country might consider to be fair in
international agreements as well. Third, regardless of their derivation, specific
applications of international law, such as treaty provisions, must be implement-
ed by the individual parties through their systems of domestic laws."
A. Domestic Water Law
1. Diversity of Domestic Law Systems
Different parts of the world have developed unique systems of water law
because "[tihe underlying philosophy of each particular system of water law has
51. DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL 192-93 (1992).
52. Id.
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a direct connection to the surrounding physical factors of its origin."53
Caponera divides domestic water law systems into four regional/cultural groups:
Islamic, Soviet, Hindu/Buddhist, and Roman (the precursor of both civil and
common law systems). 4 A brief survey of these systems reveals that different
fairness concepts are emphasized by different cultures.
Islamic water law constitutes a tangible body of law that reflects all three
fairness principles of equality, priority, and proportionality. Equality is
expressed in the right of all members of the Moslem community to have free
access to water." Priority is reflected, for example, in that the right to satisfy
thirst (for humans before animals) is superior to the right of irrigation. 6
Similarly, in allocating irrigation water, priority is given either to those nearest
the water, to those with the earliest rights, or to those occupying higher ground.
Proportionality is used in allocating the cost of water systems over users
according to the benefits each user receives from the system.
Under the former Soviet system, water was treated as a public resource
closely tied to the land." Because the primary purpose of this system was to
promote rational use of water resources, efficiency was emphasized at the
expense of fairness to individuals. 8 For example, the 1970 Fundamentals of
Water Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics did not permit using
high quality water for purposes other than drinking water or domestic
supplies. 9 In this sense, the Soviet system reflected priority according to need.
The Hindu water law system has been replaced in most countries where it
was once used. Nonetheless, it provides some interesting insights into the role
of fairness in an alternative system of water management. The Subak culture
of Bali uses a decentralized system of village irrigation.' Its most distinctive
feature is its flexibility of allocation, which considers environmental conditions
and individual need in setting fair allocations. As with many other water law
systems, domestic water use is given priority over other uses, although even
domestic use can be outweighed by the public interest in an emergency (such
as fire). Another interesting characteristic of the Subak system is its absolute
53. George Radosevich, Global Water Systems and Water Control, in WATER NEEDS FOR THE
FUTURE: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES IN A NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 39, 39 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1977).
54. CAPONERA, supra note 51, at 65-94. Caponera also includes "customary law" within his
classification scheme. The term refers to any system of traditional water resource management.
Because this is a form of law, rather than a single set of ideas, customary law cannot usefully be
examined as incorporating specific fairness principles.
55. Id. at 68-70.
56. Radosevich, supra note 53, at 43.
57. CAPONERA, supra note 51, at 84-85.
58. See id. at 86. Note that "efficiency" in this situation is not the economic definition of
efficiency as a Pareto optimal allocation. Rather, it allocates water according to some criteria of
highest and best uses, for which the cost of alternative sources presumably would be the highest.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 89-91.
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prohibition on using surface water for waste disposal. This is an example of
"forced equality," in which ever- -t is prohibited from discharging, rather than
allowing a few to pollute at tht pense of the whole.61
The Roman law tradition gave rise both to the system of civil law (followed
in much of continental Europe and its former colonies) and to the system of
common law (followed in England and the areas it has influenced, including the
United States). A distinguishing feature of civil water law is its division of
waters into public (navigable waters) and private. While historically the
government allocated and charged for use of public waters, owners of private
waters retained an absolute right (priority) over their own waterways. In recent
times, however, the granting of absolute water rights has been restricted.6'
Common law water quality doctrines have developed in several ways. In
England and the Eastern United States, the riparian doctrine has long governed
water management, while in the Western United States, management was
originally based on prior appropriation. Under the riparian doctrine, the
riparian landowner has the right to make "reasonable use"'63 of the water
flowing by. In terms of quality, the landowner has the right "to be free from
unreasonable uses of others [of the water] that cause him harm."'  Thus, all
riparian owners are treated according to equality.65 Taken literally, the
riparian doctrine prohibits nearly all harmful discharges. This doctrine has been
largely usurped by administrative law for water quality management.66
The prior appropriation doctrine is usually attributed to miners settling the
western areas of North America, although many cultures have used the
concept.67 Its primary principle is "first in time, first in right;" an allocation
rule in which the first claim has absolute priority over subsequent ones.6
Additionally, each user is limited to the amount that can be beneficially used,69
making prior appropriation a need-based doctrine of priority.7" In most areas,
the prior appropriation doctrine has been combined with other management
systems in administrative law, particularly with regard to water quality.7
61. See YOUNG, supra note 13, at 20 (describing "forced equality").
62. See, e.g., LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIvE 21 (1985).
63. CAPONERA, supra note 51, at 126. See, e.g., Lux v. Hagin, 4 P. 919, 925 (Cal. 1884);
Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Miller, 3 A. 780, 782 (Pa. 1886).
64. CAPONERA, supra note 52, at 126. See, e.g., People ex. rel. Ricks Water Co. v. Elk River
Mill & Lumber Co., 40 P. 486, 487 (Cal. 1895).
65. Alternately, one could focus on the non-riparian citizens, over whom riparian land owners
had absolute priority.
66. TECLAFF, supra note 62, at 21-26.
67. Frank J. Trelease, Alternatives to Appropriation Law, in WATER NEEDS FOR THE
FUTURE: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES IN A NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 59, 59 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1977).
68. See, e.g., Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 103 (1878).
69. See e.g., Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 12 Colo. 525, 531 (1889);
Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 551 (1872).
70. TECLAFF, supra note 62, at 22.
71. See Ann Macon McCrossen, Comment, Is There a Future for Proposed Water Uses in
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The development of anti-pollution laws and the deterioration of the
distinction between private and public waters 'iave resulted in the common law
and civil law systems treating water quality through similar systems of
administrative law. According to Caponera, the permit system in civil law
countries is "slowly rendering obsolete the former subdivision between public
and private water ownership."'72
These different sources of domestic law suggest that all three fairness
concepts consistently arise in issues of water resources management. Although
many of the traditional systems have been replaced by modern pollution laws,
they provide a diverse conceptual basis for thinking about fairness in water
quality management.
2. Administrative Law
Despite the varied origins of water law in different regions of the world,
there is a nearly universal modem trend toward applying administrative law to
the protection of water quality.73 Since administrative law is widely used, it
is useful to briefly examine the fairness concepts implied by the various
strategies of water quality management under administrative law.
There are two methods of protecting water quality: (1) limiting the amount
of waste delivered to the water body; and (2) increasing the assimilative
capacity of the water body. The latter, which includes aeration and flow
enhancement, is considered a temporary measure for coping with organic
pollution.74 Therefore, this Note only examines the various techniques
employed to limit the amount of waste entering the water. Teclaff divides these
into three classes: standards (both ambient and effluent limitations), effluent
charges or fines, and financial inducement (government subsidies of pollution
control).'
Ambient standards express the maximum allowable instream concentration
for a given pollutant in the water. By standardizing ambient levels, the
yardstick for fairness becomes water quality. Ambient water quality standards
alone do not specify how these standards are to be achieved. To meet these
standards, it is usually necessary to restrict emissions from various sources of
pollution. Water quality models enable us to determine what level of emissions
will produce a given instream pollution concentration, but not with absolute
ceitainty. Even if the total acceptable emissions are determined, ambient water
quality standards say nothing about how this allowable loading will be
distributed among potential polluters.
Equitable Apportionment Suits?, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 791, 789-99 (1985).
72. CAPONERA, supra note 51, at 79.
73. TECLAFF, supra note 62, at 24-59.
74. See Louis KLEIN, ASPECrs OF RIVER POLLUTION 424-25 (1957) (analyzing the limitations
of disposal by dilution).
75. TECLAFF, supra note 62, at 235-37.
[4:85
FAIRNESS IN WATER QUALITY
One method of limiting pollution to achieve the desired ambient standards
is to establish emissions stand rd'. Emissions standards set the maximum
allowable amount of a given po itant that each polluter may discharge. While
these standards are usually justified on the basis of ambient water quality goals,
they are often linked to technological levels (for example, the best available or
practicable technology). Emissions standards are often used because they are
relatively simple to implement and enforce. Different types of emissions
standards have different fairness implications. For example, emissions standards
may be set at a constant level, implying equality among pollution sources,
although meeting these standards may have very different costs for different
industries. Alternately, each source may be required to reduce emissions by a
certain percentage of current emissions, implying a proportionality principle
based on contribution. While ambient standards may be said to adopt a
fairness concept relative to river users as objects, the objects of emissions
standards are individual pollution sources.
Effluent charges reflect the "polluter pays principle."76 The basic premise
underlying effluent charges is that, faced with a per-unit fee, industries will
reduce pollution until the marginal cost of further reduction equals the marginal
cost of paying the effluent charge. When effluent charges are set at the correct
level, industries limit their total emission levels to the point at which desired
ambient water quality is achieved. In a sense, effluent charges encompass the
equality principle since each polluter pays the same price for each unit of
pollution. Viewed differently, the charge is proportional to the amount of
pollution emitted. Since effluent charges require polluters to pay per unit of
pollution discharged, the costs of pollution reduction are shared in proportion
to contribution.
Transferable, or tradeable, emission permits are an alternative to effluent
charges." Instead of setting a price per pollution unit and letting the market
determine the level of emissions, regulators issue a set number of tradable
effluent permits. The number issued is limited so that total effluent levels do
not exceed ambient water quality goals. The price of the permits is set through
the market at an amount that will encourage an efficient overall level of
pollution. Emissions permit systems reflect fairness principles most conspicu-
ously in their initial distribution of permits.
Government subsidies are another means of inducing industries to control
pollution. By underwriting conversions to cleaner technology, government
subsidies conflict with the polluter pays principle because taxpayers end up
paying for pollution control. Fairness principles are reflected both in the shift
away from the polluter pays principle and in the tax structure used to collect
the subsidy.
76. For discussion of the "polluter pays principle," see infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
77. See TIETENBERG, supra note 15, at 375-76.
1994]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
B. International Water Quality Law
International water law has a long his y, since the use of and rights
related to surface waters have been a primary source of conflict between
neighboring states and nations. Indeed, the word "rivals" is derived from rivus,
the Latin word for rivers.7" Although international agreements have only
recently focused on water quality, the principles invoked derive from the
extensive tradition of water use and other types of international water law."
Unlike systems of domestic water law, international water law has not been
neatly codified. General principles arise from several sources, including
international conventions, customary law, writings of international institutes,
general principles of international law, and specific international decisions.
1. International Conventions
International conventions include treaties and regional agreements between
sovereign states. Most international conventions require the nations involved
to enact appropriate domestic legislation to implement the terms of the
agreement." Although most international water conventions to date have
addressed water quantity rather than water quality (so much so that one legal
scholar commented that legal aspects of some international water quality issues
are still largely "virgin territory" 1), a number of international agreements
focusing on water quality do exist. The existence of these agreements
demonstrates that "numerous nation states [sic] have limited their freedom to
pollute international streams and lakes and thereby have practiced the principle
of limited sovereignty."2
The United Nations recently produced the Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. 3 This
convention broadly defines transboundary water courses to include both surface
water and groundwater and calls for the conservation of ecosystems and
intergenerational equity. As a general convention, however, it does not contain
specific rules for attaining these goals.
Another example of an international body agreeing to protect water quality
is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
which officially adopted the polluter pays principle.' 4 One of the OECD's
78. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1962 (1986).
79. See generally Albert E. Utton, International Water Quality Law, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 154 (Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974).
80. CAPONERA, supra note 51, at 60.
81. Jan M. Van Dunne, The Case of the River Rhine: The Rotterdam Contribution, in WATER
POLLurION LAW AND LIABILITY 75, 77 (Patricia Thomas ed., 1993).
82. Utton, supra note 79, at 157; see also infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
83. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes, 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992).
84. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [hereinafter OECD],
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purposes in doing so was to eliminate the competitive advantage of firms
located in countries that either 'ublidize or do not require pollution control."
While it is a good start, the pri. iple has had only limited application.
Despite theoretical support for the polluter pays principle, it has not been
extensively applied. 6 Political barriers and scientific uncertainty play a
practical role in limiting its implementation. 7 Applying the polluter pays
principle in the context of the fairness framework reveals immediate problems.
Identifying the objects of fairness as the polluting industries is straightforward,
but problems arise with the baseline and the yardstick. If the pristine state of
the river is used as the baseline, for example, it becomes necessary to undertake
the difficult scientific task of characterizing the unpolluted state of highly
polluted waters. Quantification of environmental damages is another problem.
Because of the difficulties associated with putting a price tag on environmental
degradation, the OECD principle requires polluters to pay only for the costs of
reducing their own pollution to the requisite level. Residual environmental
damages are left unpaid.'
The polluter pays principle is not the only method of assigning costs.
There are compelling alternatives to the polluter pays principle 9 that lead to
different outcomes under the fairness framework. For example, if pollution
reduction is viewed as an improvement over the status quo, the relevant objects
can be typified as users of the resource who benefit from the improvement. In
the case of rivers, downstream users are the primary beneficiaries of pollution
reduction. From this perspective, allocating the costs of improvement in
proportion to the benefits received might be perceived as fair-the victim pays
principle. Neither principle is more or less inherently fair. Indeed, the balance
of power between upstream and downstream parties reinforces the victim pays
perspective. This might explain some of the difficulties, observed in practice,
in implementing the polluter pays principle."0
2. Customary Law and Concepts
The "constant and uniform conduct by states" coupled with "their
conviction as to the obligatory nature of such conduct as being in conformity
THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE 6 (1975). The polluter pays principle exists in various pollution
remedies. For example, imposing effluent charges or taxes on polluters internalizes pollution
costs. See generally John Pezzey, Market Mechanisms of Pollution Control: "Polluter Pays,"
Economic and Practical Aspects, in SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACICE
190 (R. Kerry Turner ed., 1988).
85. OECD, supra note 84, at 6-7.
86. Pezzey, supra note 84, at 191.
87. J. Rees, Pollution Control Objectives and the Regulatory Framework, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 170,170-72 (R. Kerry Turner ed.,
1988).
88. Pezzey, supra note 84, at 191.
89. See, e.g., United Nations Economic Principles, supra note 33, at 9.
90. Id.
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with a judicial norm" creates international customary law.9" Treaties arise as
an expression of the rules of conduct developed in customary law.' From
time to time, customary law is codified or restated by international organiza-
tions, scholars and private institutions.
Four theories underlie international water law: absolute territorial integrity,
absolute territorial sovereignty, community theory, and limited territorial
sovereignty.93 The territorial integrity theory holds that lower riparian parties
have rights to the natural flow of rivers. Strict interpretation of this theory
essentially prohibits water quality deterioration by the upstream party. In
contrast, absolute territorial sovereignty maintains that the upstream country
is not responsible for the effects of its actions on its neighbors.94 Absolute
territorial sovereignty has limited appeal and has not been recently applied,
perhaps because most countries are both upstream and downstream riparians.
Community theory focuses on joint development and management by all states
within the drainage basin. Although some cooperative institutions are
progressing in this direction, including the International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution (ICPR), community theory cannot
be claimed to be the basis of current international water quality law. Most
modern expressions of international water quality law support limited territorial
sovereignty.
Limited sovereignty appeals to the duty not to cause harm to other states
and allows riparian states to use waters in ways that do not interfere with
"reasonable use" by others. 5  Under the umbrella of limited territorial
sovereignty, general rules concerning the use of international water resources
are evolving to include a duty of co-riparians to cooperate, to refrain from
practices likely to cause substantial injury to other states, to share information
and consult one another before undertaking major projects, and to equitably
utilize shared water resources.96
From a fairness perspective, the rule of equitable utilization is the most
interesting. What is equitable explicitly depends on the particular circumstanc-
es. For example, the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers97 state that "[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
91. CAPONERA, supra note 52, at 189.
92. Utton, supra note 79, at 157.
93. I,. at 155.
94. This theory was reflected in the Harmon Doctrine, proposed by Judson Harmon, Attorney
General of the United States, in 1895 in response to Mexico's protest against U.S. diversion of
the Rio Grande. Id. at 155-56.
95. Id. at 155.
96. CAPONERA, supra note 52, at 190.
97. INTERNATIONAL L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE FIFYY SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT
HELSINKI 447,484 (1966) [hereinafter HELSINKI RULES]. The Helsinki Rules have provided the
basis for many subsequent statements of international water law. See generally CAPONERA, supra
note 51.
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international drainage basin.""8 Reasonable and equitable shares are deter-
mined in light of all relevant factors in each particular case,99 with the Helsinki
Rules setting forth criteria to be -.ken into account when determining equitable
utilization." ° While these criteria are useful, they cannot predict what will be
considered fair, as the Helsinki Rules grant substantial discretion in applying
them.' The Helsinki Rules also contain equality concepts, e.g., "each basin
State has rights equal in kind and correlative with those of each co-basin
State."'" Applying a fairness framework to the Helsinki Rules, the nations
are the objects, the cost of preservation or cleanup is the yardstick, and the
baseline is the status quo.
The International Law Commission recently produced a clarification of
international water law in its Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses. 3 The ILC Draft' Articles provide for
watercourse agreements between basin states and set forth four general
principles: (1) equitable and reasonable utilization and participation;"°4 (2)
98. HELsINKI RULES, supra note 96 art. IV, at 486.
99. Id. art. V, at 488.
100. Id.
Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to: a) the
geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in the
territory of each basin State; b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the
contribution of water by each basin State; c) the climate affecting the basin; d) the past
utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing utilization; e) the
economic and social needs of each basin State; f) the population dependent on the
waters of the basin in each basin State; g) the comparative costs of alternative means
of satisfying the social and economic needs of each basin State; h) the availability of
other resources; i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the use of waters; j) the
practicability of compensation as a means of adjusting conflicts among users; k) the
degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial
injury to a co-basin state.
Id.
101. "The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable
share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole." Id.
102. Id. art. IV, at 487.
103. Draft Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft Report
of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc AJLN.4/L.463/Add.4
(1991) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], reprinted in 3 COLO. J. OF INT'L L. AND POL'Y 1 (1992).
See generally Doman Colloquium on the Law of International Watercourses, 3 COLO. J. OF INT'L
L. AND POL'Y 13 (1992).
104. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 102, art. V. Relevant factors are defined as
(a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a
natural character; (b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse States
concerned; (c) the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State
on other watercourse States; (d) existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (e)
conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; (f) the availability of
alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or existing use.
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general obligation to cooperate; (3) regular exchange of data and information;
and (4) relationship between different kinds of uses. 5 Although the ILC
Draft Articles set forth these guiding principles, they are not necessarily
reflected in actual cases of water quality agreements.
3. Judicial Decisions
Prior judicial decisions-including rulings by international courts, arbitrals,
and some national courts-may be taken into account in international water
disputes. International decisions, however, bind only the parties involved and
do not play as powerful a role as precedent as domestic decisions do.'0 6
Nonetheless, these decisions do reflect the development of international law.
Cases most frequently cited as relevant to international water quality law
include the Trail Smelter arbitration, the Lake Lanoux decision, the Corfu
Channel case, and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 7 Although not
dealing with water quality directly, these cases are significant because they
incorporate concepts important to international water quality issues.
The Trail Smelter case resulted from allegations by the United States that
sulfur dioxide emissions from a smelter in British Columbia, Canada, caused
property damage in Washington state."0 8 Because there was no dispute over
causation, Canada agreed to pay for previous damage, and both countries
agreed to go before an arbitration tribunal on the issue of future indemnifica-
tion payments and mitigation measures. In holding Canada liable for damage
caused in the United States, the tribunal stated:
[Uinder the principles of international law.., no state has the right to use or
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another or their property or persons therein, when the
case is of a serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence." 9
Interestingly, although the case dealt with international air quality, the tribunal
relied on U.S. Supreme Court water quality decisions for guidance.' 0 The
Id. at art. VI.
105. Id. art. X. "[N]o use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other
uses." Id.
106. CAPONERA, supra note 52, at 193.
107. For discussions of these cases, see Ludwik A. Teclaff, The Impact of Environmental
Concern on the Development of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
229 (Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974); Utton, supra note 79, at 154.
108. Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision (U.S. v. Can. 1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684,
716 (1941).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 714-15 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (involving interstate effects
of sewage release in the Mississippi River); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921)
(involving interstate effects of upstream sewage release); New York v. New Jersey, 283 U.S. 336
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decision has since been applied to water quality disputes."'
Similarly, in the Lake Lan-ux arbitration between Spain and France, an
international arbitration panel , ld that states cannot exercise their sovereign
rights in a manner that ignores the rights of other states."' The case resulted
from France's proposal to divert water from the Carol River, which flows from
France into Spain, for hydroelectric projects. The Tribunal found that Spain's
interests must be safeguarded and "that such interests include all those which
might conceivably be affected [by France], whatever their nature and even
though they do not correspond to a right.""' 3
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases"4 evoke the concept of propor-
tionality in addressing boundary demarcation on the North Sea Continental
Shelf. In its decision, the International Court of Justice held that "equity does
not necessarily imply equality," but rather that the rights of each coastal nation
are proportional to the length of its coastline."5  It is interesting that the
court focused on the length of the coastline, and not other factors, e.g.,
population density."6
Finally, the Corfu Channel case involved the duty of Albania to warn
others of the dangers of explosive mines in its territorial waters."7 Although
the Corfu Channel case did not directly address water pollution problems, the
International Court of Justice referred to "every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states."' This concept, if applied to water quality, could restrict an upstream
country's right to pollute.
In summarizing the limited number of relevant cases decided in internation-
al courts, Utton writes: "[tihough the volume of international judicial decisions
is meager, they clearly adhere to the general principle of limited territorial
sovereignty."' 9
4. General Principles of Law
In the absence of authoritative international conventions, customary rules,
or judicial decisions, general common law principles may help resolve a specific
(1931) (involving diversion of river water affecting its quality)).
111. Utton, supra note 79, at 158.
112. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain 1957), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156, 170
(1959).
113. Id. at 169 (quoting 62 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 79 (1958)).
114. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). See also LF.E.
Goldie, The Protection of the Rhine against Pollution, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 665 (1985)
(providing summaries of these cases).
115. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 113, at 49.
116. See id. at 53-55. Cf. Goldie, supra note 114, at 682.
117. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
118. Id.
119. Utton, supra note 79, at 160.
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water quality case. Caponera lists the fundamental principles for international
water law as: (1) that there be no abuse of rights (sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas); (2) that states should act in accordance with good neighborly relations
(bon voisinage); and (3) that national water laws of the individual countries
involved should be applied 'harmoniously' in international disputes." Again,
these principles are too general to define operational rules of fairness.
Nonetheless, they provide a guide for determining what is generally considered
fair in international water quality disputes.
III. CASES IN WATER QUALrrY AGREEMENTS
Given the generality of existing international water quality law, it is
necessary to analyze specific agreements to learn how fairness principles are
actually applied to achieve an equitable apportionment. While many examples
of international water resource management agreements exist, most relate to
navigation or funding of hydroelectric projects." The relatively few that do
address water quality exist predominantly in Europe and North America. Of
chief importance are the Rhine Chlorides Convention, the European Communi-
ty pollution control legislation, the Rhine Action Plan, and the U.S.-Canada
Great Lakes water quality agreements.
A. The Rhine Chlorides Convention
In 1950, a number of European countries established the International
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) to address pollution of the
Rhine." The ICPR became an intergovernmental organization in 1963 and
currently involves Switzerland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
(because of fishing interests), and the European Community. One of the first
issues addressed by the ICPR was salination caused by chloride pollution. A
significant part of the Rhine's salination is caused by potassium mining in
Alsace, France,' with the negative effects felt primarily by agriculture in the
Netherlands. 24
In 1976, the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution
by Chlorides (RCC) was signed. 5 This agreement has two parts. First, each
participating nation is required to prevent any increase in the amount of
120. CAPONERA, supra note 52, at 191-92.
121. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 8, at 2-3.
122. Christophe DuPont, Switzerland, France, Germany, The Netherlands: The Rhine, in
CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION: THE RESOLUTION OF WATER DISPUTES 97,98-100 (Guy 0. Faure
& Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1993).
123. Id. at 101.
124. Id.
125. Alexandre Kiss, The Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J.
613, 623-24 (1985).
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chloride ions discharged into the Rhine basin within its territory. Second, the
agreement sets forth a plan to reduce pollution from the mines in Alsace
through inground injection. T e costs of this injection system were to be
divided among the riparian nations with the Netherlands paying thirty-four
percent; Germany, thirty percent; France, thirty percent; and Switzerland, six
percent.'26
France did not agree to this solution until 1983.' The treaty was finally
implemented when an additional protocol was signed in 1991. 8 Although in
the interim many of the chloride pollution issues were addressed through
private law, the fairness concepts implicit in the original convention make an
interesting study. The solution and distribution of costs in the RCC is so
unusual that it has been extensively cited and analyzed.'29
The ICPR is strongly motivated by the principle that pollution of the Rhine
is the responsibility of all riparian countries. 30 The close political and
economic ties between European nations alter the typical balance of power
between upstream and downstream parties. These ties create important
linkages that motivate cooperation on the part of upstream countries. This
"solidarity principle" means that parties accept cost sharing for investments in
cleanup, such as the injection well project in France.'3'
In the fairness framework, individual countries in the RCC are treated as
the objects of fairness, although consideration is given to groups within each
country. For example, the negotiations considered the effects on potassium
mining companies in France as well as on farmers in the Netherlands.'32 The
fairness yardstick used by the RCC can be expressed in one of two ways. First,
the yardstick can be seen as the cost of reducing chloride pollution (the
perspective that applies to the potassium mines in Alsace). Alternately, the
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id. at 632-33.
128. Protocol to Curb Saline Discharges into Rhine Approved by Five Nations, 14 INT'L ENV'r
REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 544-45 (Oct. 9, 1991).
129. See, e.g., Van Dunne, supra note 81, at 76-77; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental
Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2090-91 (1993).
130. Christophe DuPont, The Rhine: A Study of Inland Water Negotiations, in INTERNATION-
AL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATION 135 (Gunner Sjtiestedt ed., 1993).
131. Id. at 143.
Another factor that can be identified as having had an impact on the negotiations is the
distribution pattern of causes (contributions to) and consequences of damages.
Gradually, the negotiators took the view that the responsibility was global, as all
countries shared in one way or another (though obviously not to the same extent) in the
pollution (e.g., not only chlorides but also toxic substances, not only mines but also
municipal waste, not only recurrent but also exceptional, accidental discharges) and the
benefits of any plan or action would be not only for the downstream actors but also for
all actors along the river. Compared to specific self-defense interests, this view
introduced into the negotiations a value-creation component.
DuPont, supra note 130, at 110.
132. See DuPont, supra note 129, at 101-02.
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yardstick can be construed as the total allowable chloride emissions.
The first part of the agreement requires all countries to keep chloride
pollution at or below current levels. This reflects the principle of prior
appropriation, or grandfathering, giving priority to existing uses. In another
sense, the status quo clause of the RCC distributes the total chloride load
according to current contribution and treats countries equally by allowing no
increases in emissions. Thus, the priority given to existing uses for chloride
disposal is balanced against the needs of agricultural users in the Netherlands.
The provisions to reduce chloride pollution from the mines in Alsace reflect this
balance. From this perspective, the funding formula is interesting. It combines
two different notions of proportionality: need, or benefit, and contribution.
France and Germany produce the majority of the chloride pollution. Thus,
their thirty-percent contributions reflect their degree of responsibility."'
Switzerland contributes very little chloride, hence its low financial responsibility
(six percent).'
Switzerland, France, and Germany receive relatively few direct benefits
from the project. On the other hand, the Netherlands contributes little to the
chloride problem, but the reduction provides it substantial benefits. In other
words, it has the greatest need. Exactly how these percentage contributions
were derived from balancing these principles cannot be understood without
scrutinizing the negotiations. As Kiss notes: "It is an ironic observation that,
although an up-river state agreed to contribute to the cost of the operation, it
is the victim state that pays the largest contribution."'35 Thus, this solution
reflects proportional contributions according to both need and contribution, a
significant deviation from the strict polluter pays principle.
B. European Community Pollution Control Legislation
A common debate in water quality management is whether to use ambient
standards or emission standards for all water bodies.'36 Opinions differ in the
European Community on this matter, with Britain favoring ambient water
quality standards and the remaining countries favoring limit values, which are
constant emissions standards. This debate can be analyzed in terms of the
fairness framework.
The limit value approach "assumes that regulation should be as stringent
as technology permits."'37 This approach is often considered fair, since each
source is equally allowed emissions, although the actual cost borne by each
133. Lammers, supra note 50, at 444.
134. Kiss, supra note 125, at 632.
135. Id.
136. Glen McLeod, Approaches to Setting of Priorities and Policies Amongst Water Quality
Protection and Enhancement Alternatives: The European Community, in WATER POLLUTION LAW
AND LIABILITY 3, 10 (Patricia Thomas ed., 1993).
137. Id. at 5.
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industry may differ greatly. The equality principle is applied in the distribution
of allowable pollution discharges among individual sources. However, when
seen from another perspective, this result does not seem so fair. Limit values
impose very different costs on different polluters in accordance with their
existing level of technology. This is apparent when one considers an entire
nation as the object of fairness and the cost of pollution control as the
yardstick. Countries with lower levels of existing water pollution control
technology, like Britain, would bear a greater burden than others in attaining
emissions standards.38
Which approach to environmental water quality standards should be
considered fair? On one hand, Britain's preference for ambient standards
focuses on ambient water quality as the significant 'good' or yardstick. From
this perspective, the objects of fairness are the users of the river, who are
entitled to an equal level of water quality. On the other hand, the other
countries might argue that, using technological requirements as the yardstick,
limit values are fair. Regardless, this example shows that the same fairness
principle (equality) has very different implications depending on how one
structures the problem.
C. Rhine Action Programme
In 1987, riparian states along the Rhine River agreed to a comprehensive
Rhine Action Programme (RAP) to restore the river's ecological balance.'39
The RAP's objective is to achieve water quality improvement by the year 2000,
such that (1) drinking water supplies are protected for the future; (2) survival
of salmon runs is guaranteed; and (3) impurities in the river sediment are
removed.4 ° To reach these goals, participating countries agreed, among other
things, to reduce their aggregate discharges by an average of fifty percent.'
This agreement to reduce total loading of certain pollutants is reminiscent
of the Thirty Percent Club for sulfur dioxide reduction. 42 The object of
fairness implied by such a proportional agreement is the riparian country.
Unless pollution control costs are raised through a general tax, however, the
burden of reducing pollutants by fifty percent falls not on the nation as a
homogenous unit but rather on individual industries. "Although initially the
agreement appears fair, depending on how it is implemented, its allocations
may, in fact, be unfair from the perspective of industries within the participating
countries. For example, industries in some countries may have already invested
138. D. Taylor et al., EC Environmental Policy and the Control of Water Pollution: The
Implementation of Directive 76/464 in Perspective, 24 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 225, 226 (1986).
139. Lammers, supra note 50, at 449. See also IRC Bases Action Plan on Approach Proposed
by West Germany on Discharges, 10 INT'L ENvTL. REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 491 (Oct. 14, 1987).
140. Lamners, supra note 50, at 450.
141. Id.
142. See Albin, supra note 2, at 8.
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more heavily in pollution control than industries located in countries with less
stringent domestic regulations. As McDonald notes, "sometimes an initial
agreement on principles is possible as long as it avoids contentious specifics of
how the principles are to be implemented.
'
"
143
D. United States-Canada Agreements on Boundary Waters
The United States and Canada have a long history of negotiating over
transboundary water resources'" that began with the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909.145 This Treaty was signed during a time when primary
concerns for both countries were navigation and development of water
resources for hydropower and flood control. Although not emphasizing water
quality, the treaty did note that neither country should cause damage to the
property or health of the other through pollution. 146 Four guiding principles
of the treaty included equality of rights, hierarchy of use, prior use, and
compensation. 147 The prior use concept protecting existing uses of the water
has not been applied to pollution. Although the treaty appears to embrace the
Harmon doctrine,'" actual practices under the treaty, including compensating
for damages, do not reflect absolute territorial sovereignty.
The treaty's principle giving both countries similar rights in the use of
boundary waters (equality) has been extremely influential with respect to water
quality. The principle of equal rights and responsibilities is shared in many
specific agreements between the two countries. For example, the 1961
Columbia River Treaty'49 stipulated that each country pay its share of
development costs as based on the location of each of three projects.
Additionally, for the three projects constructed on the Columbia, the United
States paid half of the present value of avoided flood damages (up to $70
143. McDonald, supra note 8, at 13.
144. Graham, supra note 145, at 14-18.
145. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and
Questions Arising between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909,36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter
Boundary Waters Treaty]. See generally Gerald Graham, International Rivers and Lakes: The
Canadian-American Regime, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 3
(Ralph Zacklin & Lucius Caflisch eds., 1981); David G. LeMarquand, Preconditions to
Cooperation in Canada-United States Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221 (1986).
146. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 145. "It is further agreed that the waters herein
defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury of health or property on the other." Id. at Art. IV.
147. Id. at art. VIII. The order of preference in hierarchy of uses is: 1) domestic and sanitary
uses, 2) navigation, 3) power and irrigation. This ordering reflects the priorities of 1909. Id.
What is important for purposes here is that the treaty contains an expression of priority agreed
upon through a political process.
148. See supra note 94.
149. Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961, U.S.-Can., 15 U.S.T. 1555. See generally Neil A.
Swainson, The Columbia River Treaty: Where Do We Go From Here?, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J.
243 (1986).
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million), with each country receiving half of the power produced.
Extensive cooperative efforts between the United States and Canada have
also been directed toward management of water quality in the Great Lakes.'
Of the five lakes, all but Lake Michigan are physically shared by both countries.
Although the Boundary Waters Treaty is in many ways outdated, Canada has
tried to apply its principles to water quality in the Great Lakes, maintaining
that each country deserves an equal share of assimilative capacity.' This
principle has not worked in practice, since the United States has eighty three
percent of the population surrounding the Great Lakes. 52 Not surprisingly,
the two countries define equity differently. Canada argues for equality in total
emissions allowed, while the United States prefers limits that are proportional
to population. Under the United States' view, a 'fair' allocation would reflect
its greater need for waste disposal capacity.53 These parties used different
interpretations of fairness to justify positions of self-interest. This demonstrates
the importance of early agreement on the yardstick and object of fairness, as
well as the principle to be applied.
The international water quality management cases described above indicate
that all three fairness principles were appealed to in negotiations. Without a
detailed examination of the process of negotiations, it is difficult to trace how
different fairness principles were chosen. Nonetheless, a summary of these
cases contributes valuable information about the range of principles considered.
The Great Lakes water quality agreements show how fairness arguments can
be used for strategic purposes. The European Community debate over the
choice of ambient standards limit values also employs different fairness
principles to support positions of self-interest. The Rhine Action plan reaches
beyond self-interest by adopting common goals for each participating country.
It shows how the objects of fairness (individuals versus nation-state) can affect
the fairness implications of a distribution. The Rhine Chlorides Convention is
an interesting mixture of the polluter pays principle (in proportion to
150. D.J. Williams, Great Lakes Water Quality: A Case Study, in THE SCIENCE OF GLOBAL
CHANGE: THE IMPACr OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES ON THE -ENVIRONMENT 207, 209 (David A.
Dunnette & Robert J. O'Brien eds., 1992).
151. LeMarquand, supra note 145, at 228-29.
152. Leonard B. Dworsky, The Great Lakes 1955-1985, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291, 294
(1986).
153. See generally LeMarquand, supra note 145, at 225-28.
The two countries see water resources and boundary waters differently. Americans tend
to look at boundary water resource issues from the point of view of equity and equitable
utilization, in which the rights and obligations of the individual water user are
recognized. Canadians see boundary water issues in terms of equality, and the rights
and responsibilities of the two states. The American approach aims to secure the
advantages of the larger population, the Canadian the advantages of geography and the
rigid application of the notion of territorial integrity.
Id. at 228.
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contribution) with side payments reflecting the "victim pays principle" (in
proportion to need). Detailed case studies of the negotiations leading to these
agreements might reveal which alternative conceptions of fairness were
considered and why the observed principles prevailed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This examination of fairness principles in international water quality
agreements is only a beginning. To refine understanding of fairness in water
quality agreements, further work should be done in three areas. First, the
process by which stakeholders invoke and promote various fairness frameworks
in water quality issues should be investigated. Such a study would provide
valuable information regarding the evolution of each party's initial position
through the agreement process to the final settlement stage. This method might
reveal whether given frameworks for fairness are useful for generating new,
acceptable alternatives.
Second, the database of fair solutions that have arisen in both domestic and
international agreements should be expanded. In the field of water quality,
administrative actions and judicial decisions from different cultures should be
analyzed with respect to the framework for fairness. Attention should be paid
to similarities and differences in legal tradition, geography, economy, and
development. Of particular interest will be arrangements in which the
distribution cannot be explained solely as a function of economic or political
power of the parties involved. Attention should also be paid to the relationship
between national, local, and international water quality agreements. These
relationships are becoming more relevant with the rise of the concept of the
river basin for management and planning.
Third, the changing role of fairness in a negotiation over time deserves
exploration. It might be fruitful to examine how fairness principles are invoked
in the process of negotiated decision making. The framework for fairness could
be used to analyze negotiations to identify why potential solutions were
suggested and perhaps to explain why certain solutions succeeded. Case studies
of decision making might shed light on whether the fairness principles reflected
in final agreements are purely a product of power and economic rationality or
if the principles themselves have inherent appeal and persuasive ability.
Ongoing water quality disputes should be observed closely so that the
emergence of new fairness rationales during the course of the discussion are
noted. In addition to simply describing the progression of fairness concepts
advocated during the decision making process, it would be useful to document
the evolution of the decision makers' preferences and to experiment with
providing new alternatives in the future. Hopefully, this experience will allow
us to facilitate future negotiations by providing alternative distributions from
our "tool box" of fairness principles.
Despite the extensive work that should be done in this field, it is unlikely
that significant changes will occur in how we understand the application of
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fairness to environmental problems. Environmental agreements will not
succeed unless they are perceived as fair by the parties involved. What is seen
as fair, however, will depend upon the lens through which the problem is
viewed. Altering the lens could result in an entirely different solution. Using
a descriptive approach, this Note has examined different concepts of fairness.
By applying Young's principles of equality, proportionality, and priority along
with his object, baseline, and yardstick framework, this Note has identified in
existing water quality agreements a few principles of fairness that can be placed
into a "tool box" of fairness concepts.1 54 As future researchers utilize the
approach outlined in this paper to analyze other agreements, the list of
available concepts will multiply. And as the tool box develops, it will become
an increasingly useful resource for negotiators, planners, and participants who
seek to construct lasting and fair solutions to environmental problems.
154. Although the cases reviewed in this Note are predominantly international, the concepts
derived from these agreements can be applied to either domestic or international water quality
management issues.
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